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dened-benet pension schemes
Catherine Donnelly
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Abstract
A risk of small dened-benet pension schemes is that there are too
few members to eliminate idiosyncratic mortality risk, that is there are
too few members to eectively pool mortality risk. This means that when
there are few members in the scheme, there is an increased risk of the
liability value deviating signicantly from the expected liability value, as
compared to a large scheme.
We quantify this risk through examining the coecient of variation
of a scheme's liability value relative to its expected value. We examine
how the coecient of variation varies with the number of members and
nd that, even with a few hundred members in the scheme, idiosyncratic
mortality risk may still be signicant.
Next we quantify the amount of the mortality risk concentrated in the
executive section of the scheme, where the executives receive a benet
that is higher than the non-executive benet. We use the Euler capital
allocation principle to allocate the total standard deviation of the liabil-
ity value between the executive and non-executive sections. The results
suggest that the mortality risk of the scheme should be monitored and
managed within the sections of a scheme, and not only on a scheme-wide
basis.
Keywords: Small dened-benet pension scheme, mortality risk, idiosyn-
cratic risk, systematic risk, Euler capital allocation principle, stochastic mortal-
ity, coecient of variation.
1 Introduction
A risk of small dened-benet pension schemes is that there are too few mem-
bers to eectively pool mortality risk. Here mortality risk refers to the risks
associated with members' future lifetimes. To dene what we mean by \pooling
mortality risk", we need to look at the components of mortality risk.
Mortality risk can be decomposed into two parts: systematic risk and id-
iosyncratic risk. Systematic risk arises from our uncertainty as to the correct
distribution of deaths. For example, an actuary may decide that mortality will
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1improve in the future but is uncertain as to the level of mortality improvement;
this particular type of systematic risk is often called longevity risk (see Craw-
ford et al. [2008] for a recent literature review on the topic of longevity risk).
Idiosyncratic risk comes about through random uctuations: we may know the
correct distribution of deaths for the scheme but we don't know exactly when
each member will die. The decline of this latter risk as the number of members
increases is what we mean by \pooling mortality risk".
The quantication of mortality risk is the main focus of the paper. We
quantify both the amount of systematic and idiosyncratic risk in a small dened-
benet pension scheme. Furthermore, we attempt to allocate the mortality
risk between the scheme members in order to identify groups of members in
which mortality risk is concentrated. This kind of analysis may help the scheme
manage the mortality risk posed by some groups of members, and perhaps aid
in making investment decisions such as purchasing annuities or buying-out part
of the scheme's liability with an insurance company.
The quantication of the risk of small pension schemes is touched upon in
[Richards and Jones, 2004, Section 11.5], where the amount of assets required
to meet at a 99% condence level the present value of the liabilities is calculated
for a few pension schemes. Using an extreme quantile-based risk measure, for
example value-at-risk or expected shortfall, is reasonable if there is a contractual
obligation to provide benets since the benets must be paid whichever future
scenario arises. However, we are assuming that the pension scheme's benets
are promised rather than guaranteed. We choose the standard deviation as a
risk measure as it captures \everyday" scenarios, rather than one which captures
highly unlikely, highly adverse scenarios under which the benets will probably
not be paid in full anyway. From a practical viewpoint, the standard deviation
is easy to understand and to calculate. As our focus is on small dened-benet
pension schemes, these are appealing properties since small schemes generally
cannot aord to pay for detailed risk management services and advice (we do
not discuss the ethics of such a situation).
More precisely, we quantify the mortality risk in a dened-benet scheme by
calculating the standard deviation of the present value of the scheme's liabilities
as a percentage of the expected value. This is called the coecient of variation
and often abbreviated Vco:
Coecient of variation (Vco) :=
standard deviation of liabilities
expected value of liabilities
:
The reason for considering the coecient of variation rather than the standard
deviation is due to magnitude: a standard deviation of $100000 in the liability
value is potentially a problem for a scheme with an expected liability value of
$1000000 (Vco = 10%) but much less so for a scheme with an expected liability
value of $10000000 (Vco = 1%). In Section 3, we examine how the coecient
of variation changes as we increase the number of members in the scheme for two
types of mortality models: deterministic and stochastic. When a deterministic
mortality model is used, all of the mortality risk is idiosyncratic risk since using
a deterministic mortality model implies that the distribution of deaths is known.
Stochastic models allow us to see the additional increase in mortality risk due
to the systematic risk caused by uncertainty about the distribution of deaths.
We nd that the coecient of variation under both types of mortality model is
not negligible for schemes of up to 500 members.
2A related work is Milevsky et al. [2006], which considers a group of longevity
insurance policies and examines how the average standard deviation per policy
varies as the number of policies increases. In Milevsky et al. [2006], both a
deterministic and stochastic exponential model are used in the analysis and the
numerical results obtained are in a similar vein to those found in this paper.
The numerical analysis we do in the paper is performed using a simple
dened-benet pension scheme, detailed in Section 2, in which all members are
the same age and all receive the same constant annuity benet upon survival
to age 65. (We can also regard this as a group of deferred annuity contracts.)
However, assuming that all members receive the same benet amount is a sim-
plication.
For this reason, we examine in Section 4 how an executive section in the
scheme contributes to the mortality risk of the scheme. The executives receive
a multiple of the benet paid to the non-executive members. A signicant
increase in the coecient of variation of the scheme is observed as the executives
receive larger and larger benets, although this eect diminishes as the total
membership increases. The extra funding required to meet varied benets at
a 99% condence level for a portfolio of 50 lives is touched upon in [Richards
and Jones, 2004, Section 11.5]. They look at three dierent possible benet
structures, but their analysis is not extensive or done in a systematic way as we
do here.
In [Richards and Currie, 2009, Section 8], longevity risk is considered for
a sample dened-benet pension scheme of over 2000 members. The authors
examine the distribution of the liability value around the median liability value
and use this to illustrate the eect of idiosyncratic risk on the liability valuation.
They also mention that there is a concentration risk, by which they mean the
risk that a large proportion of the liability is concentrated in a relatively small
number of members. However, they do not explicitly attempt to measure this
risk.
Therefore, having observed the increase in the coecient of variation caused
by a small executive section, we consider in Section 5 how to split the standard
deviation of the liabilities between the executive and non-executive section in
such a way that reects their risks posed to the scheme. This is a (risk) capital
allocation problem, where the risk capital is dened to be the standard deviation
of the liabilities. We use the Euler capital allocation principle to solve this, which
uses the covariance function to measure the dependencies between the members.
In the numerical examples, it is seen that the proportion of the total standard
deviation allocated to the executives is much higher than the proportion of the
executives who are members, and higher than using a benet-weighted capital
allocation. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 A model of a simple dened-benet scheme
We consider a closed dened-benet pension scheme which pays only a single-
life deferred annuity benet. There are N members in the scheme and all
members are the same age x  65. Upon survival to age 65, member n receives
a constant amount Bn per annum starting from age 65, with all payments made
continuously.
We ignore the assets of the scheme and focus solely on the liability valuation.
3The scheme liabilities are discounted using a constant interest rate and there
are no increases to the benets either before or after retirement.
Let the random variable Yn denote the present value of 1 unit per annum
payable to member n upon survival to age 65. As all members are assumed
to be the same age, Y1;Y2;::: are identically distributed random variables. We
assume that the expectation and variance of Yn exist and are nite. Using the
random variable Xn to denote the present value of the liability due to member
n, the following relation holds:
Xn = BnYn; for each n = 1;:::;N:
In standard actuarial notation, the expected value of Xn is
E(Xn) = BnE(Yn) = Bnv65 x
65 xpx  a65;
in which v is the annual discount factor, 65 xpx is the probability of survival
from age x to age 65 and  a65 is the expected present value of an annuity of 1
unit p.a. payable continuously from age 65 until death. Let the random variable
LN =
N X
n=1
Xn
denote the present value of the total liability value. In many actuarial valuations,
the liability value of the scheme is calculated by taking the expected value of
the present value random variable LN, which for the scheme described is given
by
E(LN) =
N X
n=1
E(Xn) =
N X
n=1
BnE(Yn) =
N X
n=1
Bnv65 x
65 xpx  a65:
The standard deviation of LN is not calculated, since it is assumed that LN 
E(LN), a.s., for large enough N. The justication for this is rst to assume that
lives are independent. Under the independence assumption,
Var(LN) =
N X
n=1
Var(BnYn) =
N X
n=1
B2
n Var(Y1); (2.1)
and hence
SD(LN) =
 
N X
n=1
B2
n
!1=2
SD(Y1):
While the standard deviation increases with the number of members, this is not
typically a concern. Expressed as a percentage of the expected value, the stan-
dard deviation of the total liability value decreases as the number of members
increases. The statistic to consider to see this is the coecient of variation
Vco(LN) =
SD(LN)
E(LN)
:
Assuming that lives are independent, then
Vco(LN) =
PN
n=1 B2
n
1=2
SD(Y1)
PN
n=1 BnE(Y1)
: (2.2)
4Hence
Vco(LN) 
1
N1=2
SD(Y1)
E(Y1)
;
and we see that the coecient of variation converges to zero as N tends to
innity. This means that, for large enough N, the standard deviation of the
total liability value is only a tiny fraction of the expected value and this justies
assuming LN  E(LN), a.s.
But how large enough does N have to be to condently say that Vco(LN) 
0? If the number of members N is small, then this approximation may not be
reasonable. This is the question that motivates the paper.
3 Idiosyncratic and systematic risk
In this section, we calculate for our model scheme how Vco(LN) varies with
N under a deterministic and stochastic mortality models. We assume that
all scheme members are age 40 and set Bn = 1, for all n, so that all members
receive the same amount of benet in retirement. The continuously-compounded
interest rate is 4% per annum.
For the deterministic model, the coecient of variation converges to zero as
the number of members in the scheme is increased. Hence we can think of the
mortality risk which exists in the scheme due it having too few members for
this convergence to occur as idiosyncratic risk. For the stochastic models, some
of the mortality risk cannot be removed by increasing the number of members.
This risk which cannot be removed is called systematic risk.
3.1 Deterministic Mortality Model
We begin by assuming that we believe the correct distribution of deaths for the
scheme to be modelled by the life table PMA92C10, which is based on United
Kingdom pensioner male annuitant mortality (see The Faculty of Actuaries and
The Institute of Actuaries [1999]), with no age rating and a uniform distribu-
tion of deaths between integer ages, and we refer to this as the Deterministic
Mortality Model. The particular choice of the life table is somewhat arbitrary:
we picked one which broadly captures human mortality rates experienced at
dierent ages.
The red curve in Figure 1 shows the change in the coecient of variation as
the number of members increases. For example, when N = 100, Vco(L100) =
0:039, i.e. when there are 100 members in the scheme, the standard deviation
of the present value of the liabilities is 3.9% of the expected value. Even for a
scheme with 500 members the standard deviation is still not negligible, at 1.8%
of the expected value. However, as the number of members N becomes larger,
the coecient of variation converges to zero: this convergence limit is shown by
the horizontal red line in Figure 1. The results suggest that when there are few
members in the scheme, the approximation LN  E(LN), a.s., which is often
used by pensions actuaries, may not be appropriate.
The mortality risk under the Deterministic Mortality Model is entirely di-
versiable; as the number of members increases, the mortality risk converges
to zero. The red curve in Figure 1 illustrates the impact of having too few
members in the scheme to eliminate this idiosyncratic risk.
50 100 200 300 400 500
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
5
Number of members
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
Deterministic Mortality Model
Stochastic Mortality Model 1 (+1/−1)
Stochastic Mortality Model 2 (+2/−2)
Stochastic Mortality Model 3 (+3/−3)
Figure 1: Coecient of variation for the model pension scheme using PMA92C10
as the basic life table under various assumptions about the age rating. The
horizontal lines show the minimum values of the coecient of variation that can
be obtained under each mortality model.
63.2 Stochastic Mortality Models
It is common for pension actuaries to use a standard mortality table but to age
rate the scheme members to reect the members' mortality diering from the
standard mortality table. For example, age rating members down by one year
(-1) means that we treat them as if they are one year younger for the purposes
of reading the life table. Correspondingly, we would also age rate down by one
year the retirement age. The overall eect is that the members must wait the
same time until retirement, but they live almost one year more in retirement.
Eectively, we have extended the members' lifetimes by almost one year.
Suppose there is uncertainty about which age rating to use: perhaps we
can think of solid reasons why members' life expectancies may increase (which
means age rating down) but we can also think of good reasons why their life
expectancies may decrease (which means age rating up). This may be particu-
larly relevant for small schemes because they have too few members to separate
past trends in scheme mortality (due to systematic risk) from random mortality
uctuations (due to idiosyncratic risk) to reliably estimate the past distribu-
tion of deaths, let alone make predictions about the future distribution. Thus
there may be more than one age rating that a pensions actuary may consider
as suitable to model the scheme mortality. Assigning a probability to each of
the possible age ratings results in a stochastic mortality model.
We use the above method to introduce a series of simple stochastic mortality
models. Fix a positive real number r and set
age rating =

r with probability 0:5;
 r with probability 0:5: (3.1)
We call this Stochastic Mortality Model r and note that the dierence in life
expectancies between the two possible future scenarios is almost 2r years. The
key point to note about the Stochastic Mortality Models is that they imply that
future lifetimes are no longer independent random variables. Consequently,
the random variables Y1;Y2;:::;YN either all have the distribution implied by
PMA92C10 +r or they all have the distribution implied by PMA92C10  r, and
hence they are not independent.
Recall that Bn = 1 in this section. The expected value of LN can still be
calculated
Er(LN) =
N X
n=1
BnEr(Yn) = NEr(Y1);
where we use Er to denote the expectation under Stochastic Mortality Model r.
The variance of LN is more complicated: while the random variables Y1;Y2;:::
are still identically distributed (all members are the same age), they are no
longer independent. We have
Varr (LN) = NVarr (Y1) + N(N   1)Covr(Y1;Y2)
and hence
Vcor(LN) =
1
Er(Y1)

1
N
(Varr (Y1)   Covr(Y1;Y2)) + Covr(Y1;Y2)
1=2
:
(3.2)
7From the latter expression, we see that under Stochastic Mortality Model r, the
coecient of variation never reaches zero but
Vcor(LN) !
(Covr(Y1;Y2))
1=2
Er(Y1)
as N ! 1:
The quantity (Covr(Y1;Y2))
1=2 =Er(Y1) can be interpreted as a measure of the
systematic mortality risk in the scheme. As this quantity does not depend on the
number of members N, this means that under the stochastic mortality models
there is systematic mortality risk in the scheme regardless of the number of
members.
The remaining portion of the coecient of variation, given by
Vcor(LN)  
(Covr(Y1;Y2))
1=2
Er(Y1)
is then interpreted as a measure of the idiosyncratic mortality risk in the scheme
with N members. Again, this means that when using a stochastic mortality
model, the approximation LN  Er(LN), a.s., may not be appropriate. The
appropriateness clearly depends on the magnitude of (Covr(Y1;Y2))
1=2 =Er(Y1).
The change in the coecient of variation for various choices of r as the
number of members increases is shown in Figure 1. For example, the blue curve
in Figure 1 shows the results when r = 1. For this model, when there are
100 members in the scheme, the standard deviation of the total liability value
is 5.5% of the expected value. For a scheme with 500 members, the standard
deviation of the total liability value is 4.3% of the expected value. In fact, even
as the number of members N becomes very large, the standard deviation of
the total liability value will not drop below 3.9% of the expected value: this
limit is shown by the horizontal blue line. Thus 3.9% of the expected value of
liabilities is the amount of the standard deviation which is due to systematic
risk. This means that for the scheme with 100 members, 71% (=3:9=5:5) of
the total standard deviation is due to systematic risk and the remaining 29% is
caused by idiosyncratic risk.
The most noticeable convergence feature in Figure 1 is that the convergence
rate of the coecient of variation to its minimum value increases as r increases.
This is a consequence of the covariance term increasing at a faster rate than
the variance term as the age rating r increases, so that the term Varr (Y1)  
Covr(Y1;Y2) in (3.2) is decreasing in r. We interpret this as meaning that the
idiosyncratic risk diminishes as the age rating increases.
We note that all the expected present values of the liabilities calculated using
the models in Figure 1 are almost identical since the average age rating in each
of the models is zero. The results highlight why it may not be sucient to value
a pension scheme using dierent deterministic mortality bases in an analysis of
the impact of uncertainty about the future distribution of deaths. By not taking
into consideration our views on the likelihood of the dierent mortality bases,
we fail to quantify our own uncertainty about the present value of the scheme's
liabilities.
As an aside, setting r = 0 in (3.1) results in the Deterministic Mortality
Model. It is clear that all the results in this subsection also hold under the
Deterministic Mortality Model; in the deterministic model, lives are independent
and hence Cov0(Y1;Y2) = 0.
84 Eect of dierent benet amounts
Usually in a pension scheme, members do not receive the same amount of ben-
ets for various reasons: members have dierent service histories and salaries,
and sections of the scheme may have dierent benet structures. Here we anal-
yse the eect on the coecient of variation of the members having dierent
amounts of benets.
4.1 Scheme with an executive section
Suppose that members do not all receive the same amount of benet and a
proportion  of the members receive k units per annum at retirement, for some
k 2 N. For convenience, we refer to these members as executives, but they could
also represent, for example, members who are full-time employees, have a long
service or have a signicant transferred-in benet. The remaining members in
the scheme receive a standard benet of 1 unit per annum at retirement. Setting
f(;k) :=
k2 + 1   
(k + 1   )2;
we nd
Vco(LN) =
1
E(Y1)

1
N
f(;k)(Var(Y1)   Cov(Y1;Y2)) + Cov(Y1;Y2)
1=2
:
(4.1)
We still have the result
Vco(LN) !
(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2
E(Y1)
as N ! 1; (4.2)
but for nite values of N there is an extra factor f(;k) in (4.1), which is
greater than one for all  2 [0;1]. The eect of f(;k) is to increase the
coecient of variation compared to the scheme in which all members receive
the same amount of benet. We examine numerically how this factor aects the
coecient of variation, particularly for smaller values of N, as we vary k.
For the numerical examples, we assume that all scheme members are age 40
and  = 5% of the members receive k units per annum at retirement, with the
remaining 1  = 95% of the members receiving 1 unit per annum at retirement.
The continuously-compounded interest rate is again 4% per annum.
Deterministic Mortality Model
First we examine the rate of convergence of the coecient of variation under the
Deterministic Mortality Model. Under this model, lives are independent and we
see from (4.2) that the coecient of variation converges to zero. Figure 2(a)
shows how fast this convergence occurs for various values of k. The gure also
shows a signicant increase in the coecient of variation as k increases. How-
ever, all of this risk is idiosyncratic and it vanishes as the number of members
increases. Consider the scheme with 100 members. If all members receive the
same amount of benet then the coecient of variation is 3.9%, which means
that the standard deviation of the total liability value is 3.9% of the expected
value. If 5 members receive 5 times the standard benet at retirement, then
9the coecient of variation increases to 4.9%. With these 5 members receiving
instead 20 times the standard benet, the coecient of variation increases to
9.2%.
Stochastic Mortality Model 1
Now we consider Stochastic Mortality Model 1. We plot in Figure 2(b) the
coecient of variation as the number of members increases for various values
of k. Consider again the scheme with 100 members. If all members receive
the same amount of benet then the coecient of variation is 5.5%. With 5 of
them receiving 5 times the standard benet at retirement, it increases to 6.2%.
With the 5 executive members receiving instead 20 times the standard benet,
it becomes 10.0%.
Some of this risk is systematic: the horizontal blue line in Figure 2(b) shows
the minimum coecient of variation for this model and is a measure of the
amount of systematic risk in each scheme. The amount of coecient of variation
above this line is a measure of the idiosyncratic risk in each scheme. We see
clearly in the gure the reduction in idiosyncratic risk as the total number of
scheme members N increases.
4.2 Summary
Having a relatively small proportion of the membership receiving elevated ben-
ets can increase the idiosyncratic mortality risk of the scheme considerably,
particularly for smaller schemes. Even if we are condent about the future dis-
tribution of deaths of the scheme members, the mortality risk of the scheme, as
measured by the coecient of variation, is signicantly higher when there is a
small executive section. The simple reason for this is that paying 10 units of
benet to one member is more risky that paying 1 unit of benet to 10 members.
The natural question to ask as a result of these observations is: can we
quantify the risk posed by the executive section to the overall risk of the scheme?
The answer to this question can help us to decide if it is reasonable to buy-out or
insure the executive section's benets in order to manage the scheme's mortality
risk. To this end, we turn to a capital allocation idea to attempt to analyse the
risk concentrations in the executive section.
5 Risk capital allocation
Here we use the standard deviation of the total liability value SD(LN) as a
measurement of the mortality risk in the pension scheme. We seek to allocate
SD(LN) to each member, or group of members, to reect their individual con-
tribution to the risk in the pension scheme. We call SD(LN) the risk capital.
It is important to realise that this allocation must be considered in the context
of the entire scheme so that we can allow for the impact of the dependencies
between scheme members' future lifetimes on the overall mortality risk of the
scheme.
We use the Euler capital allocation principle to allocate the risk capital be-
tween members. The theoretical details of the Euler capital allocation principle
can be found in [McNeil et al., 2005, Section 6.3.2]. We set out next how this
principle is applied to the pension scheme.
100 100 200 300 400 500
0
.
0
0
.
1
0
.
2
0
.
3
0
.
4
Number of members
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
k=1
k=5
k=10
k=15
k=20
(a) Deterministic Mortality Model.
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(b) Stochastic Mortality Model 1
Figure 2: Coecient of variation for a simple pension scheme based on the life
table PMA92C10 and 5% of the membership receiving k units per annum at
retirement, with the remaining 95% of membership receiving 1 unit per annum.
The horizontal lines show the minimum values of the coecient of variation that
can be obtained under each mortality model.
11The idea is that we wish to nd amounts 1;:::;N, corresponding to each
of the scheme members, such that
N X
n=1
n = SD(LN):
We call n the risk capital for member n and we interpret it as the amount of
the total standard deviation in the pension scheme which can be attributed to
member n. Recall that the random variable Xn denotes the present value of the
benet payable to member n and the present value of the total liability is
LN =
N X
n=1
Xn:
The Euler capital allocation principle tells us that, when the standard deviation
is used as the risk measure, we can calculate
n =
Cov(Xn;LN)
SD(LN)
=
PN
m=1 Cov(Xn;Xm)
SD(LN)
:
From the latter formula it is clear why the Euler capital allocation principle is
also called the covariance principle.
5.1 Homogeneous pension scheme
We take the example where all members receive the same retirement benet
Bn = 1, for all n. Then as all members are assumed to be the same age,
n =
1
N
SD(LN) =

1
N
(Var(Y1)   Cov(Y1;Y2)) + Cov(Y1;Y2)
1=2
:
As expected, in a scheme where all members receive exactly the same benet
and are the same age, then all members are allocated the same amount of risk
capital. Furthermore,
n ! (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 as N ! 1:
We interpret (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 as the amount of systematic mortality risk and
n  (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 as the amount of idiosyncratic mortality risk for member
n. For example, under the Deterministic Mortality Model, n ! 0 as N ! 1
and all of the risk capital allocation n can be interpreted as the amount of
idiosyncratic mortality risk for member n.
5.2 Pension scheme with an executive section
Now suppose that there is an executive section in the scheme, as in Section 4,
so that a proportion  of the members receive k units per annum at retirement,
for some k 2 N. All other members receive the standard benet of 1 unit per
annum at retirement.
We seek to allocate the risk capital between the executive and non-executive
section and analyse the split between systematic and idiosyncratic risk. First,
12Table 1: Allocation using the Euler capital allocation principle of the risk capital
by member and mortality risk type.
Mortality risk component
Member type Systematic Idiosyncratic
Non-executive (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 norm   (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2
Executive k(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 exec   k(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2
we examine the risk capital allocated to each member type, executive and non-
executive. Denoting the risk capital allocated to an executive member by exec
and the amount allocated to a non-executive member by norm, we nd that
exec ! k(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 and norm ! (Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 as N ! 1:
Interpreting the limits as the amount of systematic risk per member type, Table
1 shows the risk capital allocated by member type and split by mortality risk
component. Summing the limits over the scheme membership, then we identify
N(k + 1   )(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 (5.1)
as the total systematic mortality risk in the scheme. The proportion of the
systematic mortality risk which is allocated to the executive section is
~ pexec :=
Nk(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2
N(k + 1   )(Cov(Y1;Y2))
1=2 =
k
k + 1   
:
The latter interpretation of ~ pexec only makes sense when there is non-zero sys-
tematic mortality risk. For example, under the Deterministic Mortality Model,
Cov(Y1;Y2) = 0 and there is no systematic mortality risk. Note that when there
is systematic mortality risk, the proportion ~ pexec allocated to the executive sec-
tion is invariant to the choice of the mortality model (although the risk capital
per executive member depends on the mortality model; see Table 1).
We can also interpret ~ pexec as the proportion of the risk capital allocated to
the executive section using a benet-weighted approach. The benet-weighted
approach allocates the risk capital between members using their benet amounts
as weights. The orange curves in Figures 3 and 4 show how ~ pexec varies as 
and k vary, respectively.
While the executive members contribute k times the systematic mortality
risk of the non-executives, they contribute more to the idiosyncratic mortality
risk. This can be seen by examining the relation
exec = knorm + k(k   1)
(Var(Y1)   Cov(Y1;Y2))
SD(LN)
: (5.2)
For k = 1, the expression collapses to exec = norm. For k > 1, the risk capital
allocated to the executive members is greater than k times the risk capital
allocated to the non-executive members, even though the benet paid to the
executive members is k times the benet paid to the non-executives. However,
as N increases, the risk capital SD(LN) also increases and the magnitude of the
second term on the right-hand side of (5.2) tends to zero. Hence exec ! knorm
13as N ! 1 and, in the limit, all the mortality risk is systematic risk as the
idiosyncratic risk vanishes. Thus the second term on the right-hand side of
(5.2) is the amount of idiosyncratic risk allocated to each executive over and
above k times the amount of idiosyncratic risk allocated to each non-executive.
Next we allocate the risk capital between the executive and non-executive
sections. As
SD(LN) = N  exec + (1   )N  norm;
then
pexec := N
exec
SD(LN)
is the proportion of the risk capital allocated to the executive section using the
Euler capital allocation principle. Figures 3 and 4 show how pexec varies as 
and k vary, respectively, under various mortality models. For the gures, we
assume that all scheme members are age 40 and the continuously-compounded
interest rate is again 4% per annum. Note that for the special case where we
use the Deterministic Mortality Model, we nd
pexec =
k2
k2 + 1   
; (5.3)
so that for our simple dened-benet pension scheme, where all members are
the same age, the Euler capital allocation to the executive section is invariant
with respect to the total number of members. Hence the red curves in Figure 3
are identical, and the red curves in Figure 4 are also identical. However, this is
not true in general.
The two gures show that the proportion of the risk capital allocated to
the executive section is higher using the Euler capital allocation principle than
using a benet-weighted approach. For the Stochastic Mortality Models, as the
number of members increases in a scheme, the idiosyncratic risk decreases and
the capital allocation using the Euler capital allocation principle converges to
the benet-weighted approach allocation; this result can be seen in Figures 3 and
4. Note that the convergence rate is greatest in the models where the dierence
in the age rating r is greatest, for the same reasons as given in Subsection 3.2
for the convergence observed in Figure 1.
If we instead interpret the orange curves in Figures 3 and 4 as the proportion
of the systematic mortality risk allocated to the executive section, then we
deduce that the executive section contributes a greater proportion to the total
idiosyncratic mortality risk than to the total systematic mortality risk of the
scheme (although the amount of the idiosyncratic risk may be much smaller
than the amount of systematic risk), consistent with our earlier observation.
5.3 Summary
Risk capital allocation is a way of identifying sections of the scheme where risk
is concentrated. Using the Euler capital allocation principle to allocate the
standard deviation of the total liability value between sections, there appears to
be higher concentration of idiosyncratic mortality risk in the executive section
than would be suggested by a benet-weighted allocation. Thus, particularly
for small pension schemes, the mortality risks in the executive section should
be carefully measured and managed.
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Figure 3: Proportion of the total standard deviation allocated using the Euler
capital allocation principle to the executive section of a pension scheme with
an executive section receiving 5 times the benet of the non-executive section.
In Figure 3(a), the total number of scheme members is N = 100 and in Figure
3(b), N = 500. The red and orange curves are identical in both gures.
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Figure 4: Proportion of the total standard deviation allocated using the Euler
capital allocation principle to the executive section of a pension scheme with an
executive section constituting 5% of the total membership. In Figure 4(a), the
total number of scheme members is N = 100 and in Figure 4(b), N = 500. The
red and orange curves are identical in both gures.
166 Summary
The idiosyncratic mortality risk in pension schemes is often ignored by pensions
actuaries since it is assumed to be inconsequential. However, as we demonstrate,
it can be signicant even for schemes with a few hundred members. While
the eect of the idiosyncratic mortality risk reduces in the stochastic mortality
models we examine, this is at a cost of increasing the overall mortality risk. The
conclusion is that, to manage appropriately the risks facing a pension scheme,
it is important to quantify the mortality risk since it should not be assumed to
be negligible.
We also investigate allocating the standard deviation of the present value of
the total liabilities of the scheme between an executive and non-executive section
of the scheme. Since the nancial assumptions of the scheme are deterministic,
we regard the standard deviation as a measure of the mortality risk in the
scheme. Thus the allocation is a way of seeing where mortality risk may be
concentrated in the scheme. Using the Euler capital allocation principle, we
nd that there is a concentration of mortality risk in the executive section. In
particular, the amount of the total idiosyncratic mortality risk allocated to the
executives is much higher than would be suggested by their benet amount.
Thus it is not enough to measure the overall mortality risk of the scheme, but
also to do this within the scheme. This allows the pension scheme to manage the
mortality risks of the scheme, for example by aiding in the decision to purchase
annuities in from an insurance company in respect of all or part of the liability
in order to reduce the scheme's mortality risk.
Furthermore, while we have done the analysis in the context of small dened-
benet pension schemes, much of it is relevant to large pension schemes and to
insurance companies selling life annuities of dierent benet amounts.
Having analysed the mortality risk in isolation, the eect of other risks,
such as nancial risks, on the standard deviation and coecient of variation of
the liability remains to be studied. The impact of risk mitigation investment
strategies on the nancial health of the scheme can also be studied, which, very
importantly, introduces the scheme's assets into the analysis.
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